Harm...?

"This would actually be a good topic for the blog."- Professor Tresan

Well then, let's do it.

Before I get into the muck of things, I want to point out that this will likely be a post split into two parts, following the two parts of the in-class conversation I found most interesting. First, my original question: Do you (anyone who wants to contribute their thoughts, anyway) think a person who is themselves not emotionally, physically, mentally or otherwise hurt, but who is part of a group in which another member is hurt, done any harm?
Secondly: The three ways to define "harm" Professor Tresan suggested.

So, first, my own question. When I was figuring out how to pose this question, I was thinking about Ferguson and the events that occurred last year. I wanted to make sure I wasn't just bringing an idea forth that applies only to one situation, and want to make it clear that indeed there are many other examples: Deaf people potentially harmed by anti-Deaf attitudes; Palestinians who live in the U.S. yet are potentially harmed by what is happening in Isreal/Palestine; Muslims who are potentially harmed by the Muslim killings at the hands of ISIS/ISIL, etc.

The main idea is this however: I was thinking about one specific person (not one I have in mind from real life, just a particular human being, go ahead and name them what you'd like). This person identifies very heavily with the certain community he is part of (Ferguson example=African-American community, Palestine example=Palestinian community, etc.). This person is active in the community and protective of it and is very proud to identify with it; in general this person is very much connected with the community.

Someone else in the community- one other particular person- is harmed directly (physically, mentally, emotionally or otherwise). Do you  think this constitutes harm to the first person I described?

My thoughts are that when such a tightly knit community exists, damage done to one is damage done to them all. Not only is harm done to one of them a threat to the rest of them, but there is a care in this person I've described (and perhaps even in every member of the community) that harm is done to when another member of the community suffers.

However, I found it to be an interesting question because it's very possible that this person never cared about their community, and harm is still done to the same person, and this person is inflicted by no harm whatsoever. Looking at it from a strictly factual point of view, the original person was done no harm to them. They could carry on in their life exactly as they had before. They could act as if nothing had ever happened. Yet, it seems like the person is affected some way, and it's quite curious what kind of effect that is.

Now, for the second part, more to the idea of harm itself. Professor Tresan suggested three definitions of "harm." The first was a direct harm, the sort that the second person I described underwent. Easy enough to understand.

The second is a sort of harm that isn't inflicted directly on a person, but that the person is aware of. This would fit the first person I described.

The third- and most interesting to consider in my opinion- is a harm neither done directly to a person or a harm that person is aware of. To understand that, my mind went Poland during the beginning years of Nazi Germany, when the Nazis were going through towns and capturing Jews to bring them to concentration camps. It's not hard to imagine a young Jewish person who is kept completely in the dark by their parents, and who for one reason or another has not had any idea of the coming Nazis or that this has been happening in other cities; indeed they have no idea about Nazis or Hitler at all. That child could be playing inside with a toy while Nazis are three blocks over capturing and perhaps even killing other Jews, and are making their way through the town.

Now this situation certainly fills the criteria, and it's hard to consider if that child is being harmed or not. The reason this third option is most interesting to me is because it seems for it to qualify as harm, we have to focus on much more abstract concepts. In the example I gave, I would say the safety of that child is being harmed. That child is in danger, and the quality of its life is being harmed (surely having your community destroyed harms your quality of life), but it seems tough to say whether or not the child itself is being harmed. It would come down to whether we separate things like "the safety of the child" and "the child," which do seem like different things. However, it also seems similar to the example I gave in my question, where something important to the child is being harmed, and in this case it seems like something vital to the child's growth is being harmed, so the child is indirectly being harmed.

I'm extremely interested to see/hear what your thoughts are though.

How Powerpoint is killing critical thought

A good read as we prepare our presentations


http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/23/powerpoint-thought-students-bullet-points-information?utm_content=buffer64cde&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

the "invisible hand"

After class I realized that when I explained the metaphor of the invisible hand, I never actually explained what the phrase "invisible hand" is supposed to mean.  So I figured I'd do it on the blog.  

Recall that the idea is that, in the proper social setting (typically taken to center on a free market), narrow aims can result in broader benefits.  In class I gave the example of wanting money.  How do you make money?  By providing goods or services that people are willing to pay for.  But people pay for things they want.  So the more money I want, the more I have to provide people with what they want.  I might do that by creating some device that really adds to the sum of human happiness, like all the great technology we have today (I can listen to whatever music I want pretty much wherever and whenever I want?  how cool is that?). So my self-interested motives can result in broader social benefits.  

Here's Adam Smith: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages.”  In short, when you go to the market and there's all that great food available, it wasn't wasn't made available to you because the people who put the market there care about you (except derivatively).  

The idea of the "invisible hand" is meant to make vivid the fact that the social benefits aren't what the agents producing them are ultimately after.  Their ultimate focus is on themselves, or at least something narrower than society. But it is as if an invisible hand is guiding them to do what benefits society.  

Specific Species Evidence for the Existence of Altruism as an Evolved Trait

The following is a paper I wrote for my WRT 105 class in the Spring of 2014 that argues that morality is a byproduct of human evolution citing specific evidence from observable behavior of other mammalian species. I felt that this paper was relevant because it presents some solid evidence of the existence of traits like altruism and empathy in species which we share common ancestors with, such as the Chimpanzee. I connected this with Hierarchy in the Forest based on the arguments made based on examples from apes:

Evolutionary Background of Moral Philosophy

            A major bridge between philosophy and science is the debate between morality as a byproduct of evolution and the development of morality based in philosophical theories such as Kantian Ethics and Utilitarianism. Those who believe that morality developed as a consequence of having advantageous effects on the survivability of a previous ancestor suggest that morality was simply a trait that could have developed on any other species, while those who believe that morality was developed as a way of organizing civilization and advancing society say that morality is based in laws that dictate human action. While there is a plethora of evidence on both sides of this argument, the blending of science and philosophy currently has led to a greater acceptance of the evolutionary model of morality. One such defender of “evolutionary morality” is Massimo Pigliucci, who argues that by breaking down morality into characteristics, one can show the basis for morality’s development in humans in his book, Answers for Aristotle: How Science and Philosophy Can Lead Us to a More Meaningful Life. In this paper, I will argue that the development of human morality has its foundation in the evolutionary history of the human race using evidence presented by Pigliucci.

            Pigliucci’s main argument for evolutionary morality comes from observed altruistic actions of certain animals. Pigliucci begins by denying “the idea that only human beings are moral animals” by referencing several aspects of morality that are shared by both humans and other mammals (Pigliucci 48). One such aspect of morality is altruism, acting in such a way that your actions benefit others while having no positive reciprocation to yourself.  Pigliucci, focusing on altruism, explains that “kin selection”, acting in an instinctive altruistic manner to protect or aid a relative, is a common trait in many animals, and beneficial to natural selection in that it “maximizes the chances of passing your genes to the next generation” (Pigliucci 49). Because kin share genetic material, acting in order to protect one’s genetics, even in cases where doing so would result in death would allow one’s genetic material to continue to be passed on.  This genetic material would by relation carry genes that code for altruistic action, allowing the specific kin group to continue carrying these genes. If these genes that coded for altruism continued to be advantageous, they would continue to pass on through their genes, eventually expressing themselves in other species further in this species evolutionary tree. One extreme case of morality in terms of kin is the Belding Ground Squirrel, which will “whistle” to alert other members of its group (normally when family is nearby) of predators, purposefully drawing attention to itself while allowing others to escape (Mateo). Natural selection is essential for establishing a basis for the evolutionary argument of morality, which I will further build off of this base.

            A secondary basis of evidence of evolutionary morality argued by Pigliucci is that of both “reciprocal altruism” and “indirect” altruism (Pigliucci 50-51). Reciprocal altruism is an argument put forth by Robert Trivers and Anatol Rapaport which reasons that altruism would be favored by natural selection if  “there is the expectation of the other actor returning the favor at a later time” (Pigliucci 50). Evidence is presented of this form of altruism by examining vampire bats feeding members of their group that do not feed successfully, with the expectation that the same will be done for them in a future situation, regardless of kin relation (Pigliucci). What this seems to suggest is that animals not only assist their family in times of need, but are also sympathetic of all members of their surrounding environment in order to have these feelings reciprocated in the future, which was originally thought to be only a characteristic of humans. The idea of the “Golden Rule” in Christianity explains this idea well in humans. Jesus Christ teaches his followers to “do onto others as they would do onto you”, in order in the future to have acts of kindness directed back towards yourself. Indirect reciprocity deals with situations where two actors normally do not see each other often, which gives one actor incentive to cheat and balk out when the time has come to return a favor under the guise of not being around enough to assist. In this case, reputation is established, where other members of the group see reciprocity taking place, and “judge” actors based on the amount of times they cheat (Pigliucci 52). Pigliucci mentions that this form of reciprocity is present in different species of primates, suggesting that primates may have a system of “justice”, with the most “just” (those who cheat the least) being the most successful mates, carrying on the sense of justice in their genetic code, once again providing an evolutionary basis for the formation of justice and morality (Pigliucci 52-53). With these forms of reciprocity and altruism shown in other, closely related mammals, Pigliucci strongly argues for an evolutionary basis to morality.

            There are three major objections to the idea the morality is an evolved trait. The first is that while altruism may be a common trait among more developed animals, morality in humans is based on the “ability to empathize”, which no other creatures besides humans have (Pigliucci 54). The difference between altruism and empathy is that while altruism is more of a physical action, empathy is a feeling signifying recognition of another’s emotions towards a certain situation, such as feeling bad for someone who has lost a relative. It has long been thought that because empathy does not exist outside of human beings because of its complexity of emotion and social relations. However, there is significant evidence that shows that not only do other species besides humans possess the ability to empathize with others in their groups, but empathy is as significant in animal societies as in humanity. Jane Goodall’s work with chimpanzees showed that “When a male is attacked, he will often run screaming in obvious distress to a companion, at which point the two will embrace and scream in concert. Or the distressed male may seek his mother and simply hold her hand” (Pigliucci 54). These obviously empathetic reactions also show a telling aspect of chimpanzee social relations, as most judgments and social organization is based on empathetic relations between members, not unlike human society. Furthermore, this shows that if morality is solely a human characteristic, it cannot be based in empathy, and gives greater merit to the idea that morality is an evolved trait of humanity.

            A larger objection to evolutionary morality is the question of whether or not these traits in animals discussed are actually the basis of morality, as “true morality” possesses a “conscious sense of right and wrong”, and a “strong feeling of indignation” when faced with a morally unjust action (Pigliucci 55). The counter to this question is the explanation of neurobiological “automatic social behaviors” (Pigliucci 55). Many researchers claim now that morality could have begun with automatic behaviors in animals such as attachment to kin and altruistic actions towards these members. Reciprocal altruism towards non-kin group members, would develop next, and eventually underlying “emotional responses” that dictate morality in humans would develop (Pigliucci 55). Essentially, this model of the evolution of a sense of true right and wrong undermines the concept that true morality exists only in humans. In Joshua D. Greene’s The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, evidence through neuroimaging shows that much of deontological (rational) ethics is “emotionally driven”, showing greater support to the idea that emotional responses are more motivated by an evolutionary undertone than expected (Greene 41). This shows that right and wrong, as well as strong feelings against unjustness can be motivated by subconscious evolutionary concepts of altruistic and emotional nature.

            A final objection that can be raised against evolutionary morality comes from Glaucon’s argument for the nature of justice and law in Plato’s Republic. Glaucon considers the nature of justice not a natural state of human beings, but a sort of “compromise” in order to advance and coexist in society (Plato). Glaucon thinks (much like many early evolutionary biologists according to Pigliucci) that the natural state of human being is injustice and selfishness, acting in a way that benefits no one but themselves. By extrapolating Glaucon’s argument, one could protest by using Glaucon’s nature of man as an example of the impossibility of morality evolving, as altruistic actions would have no benefit to earlier species. However, as shown by “kin selection” and the discussed forms of altruism, actions that have no benefit to the actor in question can still be advantageous to evolutionary selection, as genes from family members and community member can still be passed down (Pigliucci). These altruistic actions disproves Glaucon’s claim that the natural state is selfishness, as these animals who exist in a natural state have social order, a sense of altruism and empathy towards other members of their species, and benefit from these actions by carrying on genetic material. New evidence from many researchers shows that unselfish actions occur in species, perhaps suggesting that justice IS the natural state of humanity, contrary to Glaucon’s argument.

            In summary, I have argued that morality evolved through natural selection of beneficial traits. This explanation is a blending of science and philosophy, often thought to be two separate fields of study. In fact, this evidence shows the contrary. Science and philosophy often can provide answers to many of the questions each field struggles with, such as the nature of morality, and bioethics. Research done by members of the scholarly community such as Pigliucci and Greene is part of the ever- growing connections between disciplines of the humanities and sciences, and has promising implications for the future.

Works Cited

Greene, Joshua D., and Fiery Cushman. "The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul." The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. 35-66. Print.

Jill, Mateo. "Belding's Ground Squirrel Research." Belding's Ground Squirrel Research. Mono Basin Clearinghouse, 1999. Web. 03 Mar. 2014.

Pigliucci, Massimo. "The Evolution of Morality." Answers for Aristotle: How Science and Philosophy Can Lead Us to a More Meaningful Life. New York: Basic, 2012. 45-58. Print.

Plato, G. R. F. Ferrari, and Tom Griffith. The Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000. Print.

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